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Differences and similarities between intrusive thoughts typical of obsessive-
compulsive disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, and hypochondriasis are relevant for 
their differential diagnosis, formulation and psychological treatment. Previous research 
in non-clinical samples pointed out the relevance of some process variables, such as 
responsibility, guilt, or neutralization strategies. This research is aimed to investigate the 
differences and similarities between clinical obsessions, worries and illness intrusions in 
some of these process variables. A second aim is to identify models based on these 
variables that could reliably differentiate between them. Three groups of patients with 
obsessive-compulsive disorder (n=35; 60% women, mean age 38.57), generalized anxiety 
disorder (n=36; 61.1% women, mean age 41.50), and hypochondriasis (n=34; 70.6% 
women, mean age 31.59) were evaluated using the Cognitive Intrusions Questionnaire – 
Transdiagnostic Version (Romero-Sanchiz, Nogueira-Arjona, Godoy-Ávila, Gavino-
Lázaro, & Freeston, 2017). The results showed that some appraisals (e.g. responsibility 
or egodystonicity), emotions (e.g. guilt or insecurity), neutralization strategies and other 
variables (e.g. verbal content or trigger from body sensation) are relevant for the 
discrimination between obsessions, worries and illness intrusions. The results also 
showed three stable models based on these variables for the discrimination between these 
thoughts. The implication of these results in the diagnosis, formulation and psychological 
treatment of obsessive-compulsive disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, and 
hypochondriasis are discussed. 
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Key Practitioner Message 
 The current study provides evidence about the discrimination between clinical 
obsessions, worries and illness intrusions from a transdiagnostic perspective. 
 The differentiation between them is crucial for the diagnosis, formulation and 
psychological treatment of obsessive-compulsive disorder, generalized anxiety 
disorder, and hypochondriasis. 
 Appraisals such as responsibility or egodystonicity, emotions such as guilt or 
insecurity, and other variables such as frequency, neutralization strategies or 
verbal form were found relevant for the discrimination between these types of 
thoughts. 
 Three stable binary logistic models including these variables were developed for 





Differences and similarities between intrusive thoughts typical of obsessive-
compulsive disorder (OCD), generalized anxiety disorder (GAD), and hypochondriasis 
are relevant for both differential diagnosis and psychological treatment. Obsessions, 
worries and illness intrusions are part of the diagnostic criteria of those disorders and are 
crucial for the cognitive behavioural therapy applied to them. Furthermore, the processing 
of those thoughts is key in cognitive models of OCD, GAD or hypochondria. For instance, 
Salkovskis (1985), in his cognitive behavioural model of OCD, consider that the 
interpretation of responsibility for harm of intrusive thoughts are necessary to the 
development of OCD (Salkovskis & Millar, 2016). Also Dugas and colleagues (Dugas, 
Gagnon, Ladouceur, & Freeston, 1998; Dugas, Marchand, & Ladouceur, 2005) consider 
that the interpretation of worries as excessive or uncertain is crucial in their model of 
GAD, leading to excessive anxiety and counterproductive strategies, which contribute to 
the maintenance of the disorder. Finally, Warwick and Salkovskis (1990) place the 
misinterpretation of intrusions about illness (also of bodily sensations) at the centre of 
their model of hypochondriasis, leading to a series of behavioural, affective, cognitive 
and psychological reactions.  
Some authors have studied the differences and similarities of different types  intrusive 
thoughts using different versions of the Cognitive Intrusions Questionnaire originally 
developed within the context OCD (CIQ; Freeston, Ladouceur, Thibodeau, & Gagnon, 
1991). In a series of studies in the early nineties, Freeston and colleagues investigated 
descriptive features of intrusive thoughts, the way they were appraised, and the emotions 
and cognitive and behavioural responses that were found in non-clinical samples 
(Freeston et al., 1994; Freeston, Ladouceur, Provencher, & Blais, 1995; Freeston et al., 
1991; Freeston, Ladouceur, Thibodeau, & Gagnon, 1992; Freeston & Ladouceur, 1993). 
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Some years later, the same research group carried out two studies using within-subject 
methodology and non-clinical samples. In the first study (divided in two articles) they 
compared obsessions and worries (Langlois, Freeston, & Ladouceur, 2000a, 2000b) and 
in the second one they compared illness intrusions with obsessions and worries (Langlois, 
Ladouceur, Gosselin, & Freeston, 2004). 
When comparing non-clinical obsessions and worries (Langlois et al., 2000a, 2000b), 
they found, among other results, that worries were more frequent and lasted longer, their 
content were appraised as more unpleasant, disturbing and egosyntonic, they interfered 
more in daily life, and they were perceived as more based in reality than obsessional 
intrusive thoughts. On the other hand, obsessions were more unwanted, uncontrollable 
and egodystonic, and the participants felt more responsible for their presence or their 
possible consequences. In addition, the individuals estimated that the seriousness of the 
consequences predicted by their obsessions were worse than those of their worries. They 
also found that worries were more frequently in verbal form, while obsessions were 
experienced more often as images. Findings about strategies in response to thoughts 
indicated that for both obsessions and worries, problem-focused strategies were related 
to the appraisals that the content has a basis in reality, and escape/avoidance strategies 
were related appraisals that the intrusion was egodystonic (Langlois et al., 2000b). 
However, there were subtle differences between both types of thoughts in the factor 
structure of the strategies: neutralization, that is “any voluntary, effortful cognitive or 
behavioural act that is directed at removing, preventing, or attenuating the thought or the 
associated discomfort” (Freeston & Ladouceur, 1997, p. 344), loaded as a problem-
focused strategy for obsessions and as an escape/avoidance strategy for worries. 
In the study of the comparison between illness intrusions, worries and obsessions 
(Langlois et al., 2004), the results were generally consistent with the above. However, 
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some differences between them were found. The results showed that, from a dimensional 
standpoint, illness intrusions fell between obsessions and worries on some characteristics 
such as frequency, feeling of insecurity and verbal or visual form. Further, illness 
intrusions created less feelings of responsibility if the thought were to become real, and 
less feelings of guilt for having the thought than for obsessions and worries. They also 
reported that appraisals of egodystonicity/egosyntonicity, disapproval and the extent to 
which the thought had a basis in reality discriminated between the obsessions, worries 
and illness intrusions. Finally, for illness intrusions, similarly to Langlois et al. (2000b), 
problem-focused strategies were more related to basis in reality and escape/avoidance 
strategies to the egodystonic nature of the thoughts. It is also important to note that 
neutralization loaded among the problem-focused strategies for illness intrusions.   
Two related methodological issues should be highlighted. First, the studies described 
above were conducted on non-clinical samples and as Langlois et al. (2004) point out, 
people with a diagnosis of OCD, GAD or hypochondriasis may appraise their thoughts in 
a different manner. Second, although within-participant designs have been used 
extensively to compare thoughts of different types, Langlois et al. (2004) indicate the 
need of a between-participant methodology, especially in order to compare the different 
kind of thoughts that characterize the problems at a clinical level. 
Since its initial development to investigate intrusive thoughts related to OCD, various 
versions of the CIQ have used to compare other kind of thoughts, such as depressive 
rumination and worry (Watkins, 2004; Watkins, Moulds, & Mackintosh, 2005) and 
rumination and obsessions (Wahl et al., 2011), the latter study on clinical samples. The 
CIQ has recently been extended to a transdiagnostic version (CIQ-TV) and validated 
including a wider range of variables associated with intrusive thoughts that may 
characterize a range of disorders, such as OCD, GAD, hypochondriasis, depression, social 
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phobia and some components of psychotic disorders (Romero-Sanchiz, Nogueira-Arjona, 
Godoy-Ávila, Gavino-Lázaro, & Freeston, 2017). 
The aim of this study is to investigate the differences and similarities between 
obsessions, worries and illness intrusions. For this purpose, three groups of patients with 
OCD, GAD, and hypochondriasis were evaluated using the CIQ-TV. The first objective 
was to test whether variables that were found to differentiate between non-clinical 
obsessions, worries and illness intrusions would also differentiate between their clinical 
counterparts. The second objective was to identify models based on these variables that 
could reliably differentiate between the three types of thoughts. 
The initial aims of the study are to replicate and extend the findings of the previous 
studies on non-clinical participants and within-participant methodology (Langlois et al., 
2000a, 2000b, 2004) by using clinical samples and between participants. There are ten 
predictions based on these studies and there are two predictions based on items not used 
in the previous studies but added to the CIQ-TV. 
Appraisals: 1) Obsessions will lead to stronger feelings of responsibility than worries 
if they were to become real, and worries more than illness intrusions. 2) Obsessions will 
provoke greater disapproval than both worries and illness intrusions. 3) Obsessions will 
be rated as more egodystonic than illness intrusions, and the latter more than worries. 4) 
Worries will be rated as more strongly based in reality than illness intrusions, and these 
more than obsessions. 
Emotions: 5) Obsessions and worries will lead to greater feelings of guilt for having 
the thought than illness intrusions. 6) Worries will lead to greater feelings of insecurity 
than illness intrusions, and the latter more than obsessions. 
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Strategies: 7) Neutralization strategies will be used more frequently in response to 
obsessions than in response to worries or illness intrusions, as strategies where there is a 
functional link between the thought content and the strategy are more frequent in OCD 
than GAD (Ladouceur, Freeston, et al., 2000).  
Other features: 8) worries will be more frequent than illness intrusions and those more 
than obsessions 9) Worries will be experienced in verbal form more than illness intrusions 
and those more than obsessions 10) Obsessions will be experienced in visual form more 
than illness intrusions and those more than worries. 
The two hypotheses based on items that were included in the CIQ-TV (Romero-
Sanchiz et al., 2017) were the following. The first one is that 11) worries will lead to 
stronger feelings of guilt for not having the thought (i.e. not worrying) than obsessions 
and illness intrusions given that positive beliefs about worry are frequent (e.g. couple of 
refs needed – one from Laval group, one from Wells). The final hypothesis is that 12) 
body stimuli will be reported to trigger illness intrusions more frequently than they trigger 
obsessions and worries based on cognitive models of hypochondria (Warwick & 
Salkovskis, 1990) or hypochondriasis. Differences between groups on the other items of 
the CIQ-TV will be examined and reported as supplementary material. 
A second objective of this study will be to test the discriminant power of equations 
based on the same 12 variables between the three pairs of thought types: obsessions vs. 






Three groups of patients attending a mental health outpatient center of the Spanish 
National Health Service participated in this study. Thirty-five were diagnosed of OCD, 
36 diagnosed of GAD, and 34 diagnosed of hypochondriasis (see Table 1). Two patients 
with a primary diagnosis of OCD had a secondary diagnosis of GAD and one of 
hypochondria. Three patients with a primary diagnosis of GAD had a secondary diagnosis 
of OCD. Five patients with a primary diagnosis of hypochondriasis had a secondary 
diagnosis of GAD. Patients with a severe psychiatric disorder in Axis I 
(alcohol/substances abuse or dependence, psychotic disorders, bipolar disorders, or 
dementia) were not included in the study. 
 
//Please insert Table 1 here.// 
 
2.2. Procedure 
Recruitment and assessment took place in a mental health outpatient setting. 
Psychiatrists and psychologists asked their patients diagnosed of OCD, GAD or 
hypochondriasis whether they wished to participate in a research project about the 
assessment of their psychopathology. The participants of the research project received a 
thorough assessment by an experienced clinician and a structured, empirically supported 
psychological treatment for their psychopathology. All participants who agreed to take 
part in the study signed an informed consent form and were evaluated by the clinician 
(between 3 and 4 hours). The clinical diagnosis was confirmed using the Structured 
Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis I Disorders (First, Spitzer, Gibbon, & Williams, 
2002). After that, the participants received from the clinician a booklet with a number of 
questionnaires relevant to different anxiety and mood disorders. The clinician reviewed 
the instructions for the questionnaires with the patient, and answered any questions. The 
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target thoughts reported in the CIQ-TV were checked by the clinician in order to ensure 
that they were typical of the presentation of the primary disorder that had been diagnosed, 
that is, an obsession in patients with a primary diagnosis of OCD, a worry in patients with 
a primary diagnosis of GAD and an illness intrusion in patients with a primary diagnosis 
of hypochondriasis, and were agreed as therapeutic targets. They were asked to complete 
the questionnaires at their home in a quiet environment. The research project was 




2.3.1. Cognitive Intrusions Questionnaire (CIQ-TV; Romero-Sanchiz et al., 
2017). The CIQ-TV has 79 items assessing different variables associated with the 
processing of intrusive thoughts across a wide range of disorders. In this questionnaire, 
the respondent is asked to indicate on a list which kind of thoughts they have had during 
the last month. Next, the respondent selects the most disturbing thought they have 
experienced during that period. Finally, the respondent is asked to rate 79 items about 
different variables associated with this thought on a 1 to 9 Likert scale. The items have 
the following structure: “How guilty does this thought make you feel?” or “If this thought 
really happened in your life, to what extent would you feel responsible?” This 
questionnaire does not generate total score; each item assesses a different construct 
relevant to models of intrusive thoughts. However, Romero-Sanchiz et al. (2017) 
examined its factor structure and obtained one factor for intrusiveness, four for appraisals 
(OCD, two for GAD, depression and social phobia), three for emotions (egosyntonic, 
egodystonic and guilt-related emotions), and two for strategies (thought-focused and 
problem-focused). Validity, Internal consistency and test-retest reliability of each factor 
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was established on a non-clinical Spanish sample and ranged from medium to very good 
(Romero-Sanchiz et al., 2017). 
 
2.3.2. Obsessive Compulsive Inventory - Revised (OCI-R; Foa et al., 2002). This 
questionnaire has 18 items with three items on each of six subscales: washing, checking 
or doubts, obsessions, mental neutralization, arrangement and hoarding. Spanish version 
of this questionnaire confirmed the same 6-factors structure, and found a high internal 
consistency (α = .88) and good test-retest (r = .67) reliability (Fullana et al., 2005). 
 
2.3.3. Worry and Anxiety Questionnaire (WAQ; Dugas et al., 2001). Ten items 
corresponding to the DSM-IV (APA, 2000) criteria for GAD form this questionnaire. The 
patient rates each item on a 1 to 9 Likert scale, with higher scores for higher frequency or 
intensity. The Spanish version of the questionnaire has very good internal consistency (α 
= .91) and test-retest reliability (r = .80) (Ibáñez Fernández et al., 2000). 
 
2.3.4. Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996). This 
inventory has 21 multiple-choice items reflecting typical symptoms of depression. This 
scale has high internal consistency in both clinical and non-clinical samples (α = .93 and 
.92) and good test-retest reliability (r = .93) (Beck et al., 1996). The Spanish version of 
the BDI has similar psychometric properties in both clinical (Sanz, García-Vera, 





2.3.5. Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI; Beck, Epstein, Brown, & Steer, 1988). This 
questionnaire has 21 items of anxiety rated on a 4-point Likert scale. The BAI has an 
excellent internal consistency (α= .92) and very good test-retest reliability (r = .75) (Beck 
et al., 1988) (Beck et al., 1988). The Spanish version of this questionnaire has equivalent 
psychometric properties (Magán, Sanz, & García-Vera, 2008). 
 
2.3.6. Short Health Anxiety Inventory (S-HAI; Salkovskis, Rimes, Warwick, & 
Clark, 2002). The SHAI has 18 items which evaluate health anxiety, regardless of the 
health status of the person. The items assess worry about health, awareness of physical 
sensations or bodily changes, and feared consequences of having a disease. The S-HAI 
has shown good reliability, criterion validity and sensitivity to treatment (Salkovskis et 
al., 2002). The Spanish version of the questionnaire used for this research had excellent 
internal consistency (α=.91) test-retest reliability (intraclass correlation coefficient = .86) 
(Romero-Sanchiz, Nogueira-Arjona, Gavino, & Godoy, 2008; Romero-Sanchiz, 
Nogueira-Arjona, Gavino, & Godoy, submitted for publication). 
 
2.4. Data analysis 
One-way ANOVAs, followed by Tukey’s HDS (Games-Howell for unequal variance) 
will be used to compare groups.  Bonferroni correction will be used in order to prevent 
type I errors; with 12 tests, results significant at p < .05/12 are indicated with a double 
asterisk in Table 1. In case of differences on age, gender, and measures of depression or 
anxiety (but not those expected between the groups), additional ANCOVA analyses will 
be performed.  
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Three binary logistic regression analyses will test whether the selected 12 
variables are able to differentiate between each pair of thought types: obsessions vs. 
worries, obsessions vs. illness intrusions, and worries vs. illness intrusions. The Hosmer-
Lemeshow statistic will be used as indicator of the goodness of fit for each logistic 
regression model. The discriminative power of each model will be evaluated by receiver 
operating characteristics (ROC) analysis evaluating the area under the curve (AUC). A p 
value inferior to 0.05 will be considered statistically significant. ROC curves and scatter 
dot plots showing the predictive probabilities of belonging to one diagnostic category or 
another will be plotted for each analysis. 
Statistical analyses were performed using IBM SPSS Statistical version 22.0 
(IBM, Armonk, NY, USA) and Graph-Pad Prism version 6.01 (GraphPad Software, San 
Diego, CA, USA). 
 
3. Results 
3.1. Preliminary Analyses 
Table 1 shows that each group scored significantly higher on its corresponding 
measure than the two other groups. The most frequent subtype of OCD was contamination 
(42.9%), followed by checking (28.6%), sexual (14.3%) and others (14.3%). None of the 
target obsessions or worries reported by the patients were illness-related thoughts. 
Patients diagnosed with hypochondriasis were significantly younger than the other two 
groups. More GAD patients were diagnosed with a comorbid disorder (especially 
depression, 41.7%) with than the other groups. Also, GAD patients scored higher on 
depression than patients with hypochondriasis and OCD. Additional ANCOVA analyses 
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with age and depression as covariates were performed after the planned ANOVAs. Also, 
age and depression were included as covariates in the logistic regression analyses. 
 
3.2. Comparisons of Intrusions across Groups 
The results of the ANOVAs are shown in Table 2. There was partial support for the 
hypothesis about responsibility; OCD patients scored higher than the other two groups, 
but the difference between GAD and hypochondriasis patients was not statistically 
significant. As predicted, obsessions provoked more disapproval than worries and illness 
intrusions. The hypothesis about egodystonicity was partially supported as obsessions 
were more egodystonic than the other thoughts, but illness intrusions were not more 
egodystonic than worries. In the same way, the hypothesis about the thoughts’ basis in 
reality was partially supported.  Worries were considered more based in reality than the 
other thoughts, but illness intrusions were not considered more based in reality than 
obsessions. All differences for appraisals remained significant after Bonferroni 
correction. 
//Please insert Table 2 here.// 
 
The analyses of the items about emotions showed that OCD patients scored 
significantly higher than the other two samples on guilt for having the thoughts, partially 
support the hypothesis, which predicted that worries should also provoke more guilt than 
illness intrusions. Patients with GAD reported more guilt for not having the thought than 
the two other groups, fully supporting the hypotheses. Contrary to predictions, obsessions 
provoked more insecurity than illness intrusions. Further, there was no significant 
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difference between worries and the other thoughts on this variable. Only the final analysis 
did not remain statistically significant after Bonferroni correction (p=0.005, p>.05/12). 
As predicted, OCD patients used neutralization strategies significantly more 
frequently than the other two samples. This comparison remained significant after 
Bonferroni correction. 
Contrary to predictions, there was no significant difference between the frequency of 
obsessions and worries. However, the duration of obsessions and worries was longer than 
illness intrusions. The hypotheses about verbal and visual content of the thought received 
partial support. As expected, worries were significantly more verbal than obsessions, and 
obsessions were significantly more visual than worries. However, although illness 
intrusions did fall between them in both verbal and visual content, they were only 
significantly less verbal than worries and less visual than obsessions. Finally, as 
predicted, patients with hypochondriasis scored higher than the other two groups on the 
item “body sensation as a trigger”.  All differences remained significant after Bonferroni 
correction except for verbal content. 
 
3.3. ANCOVAs 
Ten out of 12 differences remained significant after ANCOVAs controlling for group 
differences in age and depression; the differences in basis in reality and verbal 






3.4. Discriminating between Groups 
The first set of logistic regression analyses was carried out in order to discriminate 
between obsessions and worries. The analyses showed a stable model with a non-
significant Hosmer-Lemeshow test (Chi-Square = 3.750; df = 7; p = .808): guilt, 
disapproval, neutralization strategies (higher in obsessions), guilt for not having the 
thought, and verbal content (higher in worries) were all significant predictors. The AUC 
was statistically significant (AUC = .985; p < .001; Fig. 1a), and a cut-off score of .498, 
(sensitivity was 97.22% and specificity was 94.29%). The means of the predictive 
probabilities of the model between obsessions and worries (Fig. 1b) were respectively 
0.073 (SD=0.193) and 0.914 (SD=0.187). The differences between groups were 
statistically significant (U=19.00; p<0.001). 
The second logistic regression analysis for obsessions and illness intrusions showed 
a stable model with a non-significant Hosmer-Lemeshow test (Chi-Square = 1.295; df = 
8; p = .996). Guilt, responsibility, egodystonicity, neutralization strategies (higher in 
obsessions) and corporal stimuli as a trigger (higher in illness intrusions) remained as 
predictors. The AUC was statistically significant (AUC = .978; p < .001; Fig. 1c), and a 
cut-off score of .3342 (sensitivity = 100.0%; specificity = 88.57%). Regarding the 
predictive probabilities of the model between obsessions and illness intrusions (Fig. 1d), 
the mean predictive probabilities were respectively 0.112 (SD=0.240) and 0.885 
(SD=0.186). The differences between both types of thoughts were statistically significant 
(U=26.00; p<0.001). 
 For worries and illness intrusions, the model was stable with a non-significant 
Hosmer-Lemeshow test (Chi-Square = 1.333; df = 7; p = .998). Only guilt, basis in reality 
(higher in worries), and body stimuli as a trigger (higher in illness intrusions) remained 
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as predictors. The AUC was statistically significant (AUC = .977; p < .001; Fig. 1e) and 
the cut-off score was .285 (sensitivity = 100%; specificity = 86.11%). The means of the 
predictive probabilities of the model between worries and illness intrusions (Fig. 1f) were 
respectively 0.118 (SD=0.248) and 0.876 (SD=0.192). The difference between both 
groups were statistically significant (U=28.00; p<0.001). 
 
//Please, insert Figure 1 here.// 
 
4. Conclusion and Discussion 
The aim of this study was to compare aspects of the processing of intrusive thoughts 
among three groups of patients with OCD, GAD and hypochondriasis respectively. Most 
of the hypotheses were at least partially supported by the results. However, some 
discrepancies between these results and those obtained by Langlois et al. (2000a, b, 2004) 
using within-participant designs and non-clinical samples are worth discussing in detail. 
As stated in the introduction, it was expected that some of the results that they found in 
non-clinical samples were not replicated in clinical samples. Despite the relevance of 
analogue studios for clinical research is well established (Abramowitz et al., 2014), 
cognitive-behavioural models of psychopathologies (particularly anxiety-related 
disorders) assume that the difference between patients with a disorder and healthy 
subjects is not that the former do experience obsessions, worries or illness intrusions and 
the later do not, but the way in which patients process this type of thoughts. 
With respect to appraisals, the results supported partially the hypothesis about 
responsibility. Given that responsibility is central to most cognitive models of OCD 
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(Obsessive Compulsive Cognitions Working Group, 1997; Rachman, 1997; Salkovskis 
et al., 2000) but not included in models of GAD  (Behar, DiMarco, Hekler, Mohlman, & 
Staples, 2009; Romero-Sanchiz, Nogueira-Arjona, Godoy-Avila, Gavino-Lazaro, & 
Freeston, 2015) or hypochondria (Warwick & Salkovskis, 1990) this is not surprising. 
The results fully supported the hypothesis that obsessions would provoke more 
disapproval than the other thoughts. Despite the content of obsessions, worries or illness 
intrusions being unpleasant, the moral connotation of disapproval seems to be crucial in 
differentiating between obsessions and the other thoughts (Langlois et al., 2004). The 
hypotheses about egodystonicity and the basis in reality of the thoughts were partially 
supported by the results. As expected, obsessions were considered more egodystonic than 
worries and illness intrusions, and worries more based in reality than obsessions and 
illness intrusions (Langlois et al., 2000a, 2000b; Turner, Beidel, & Stanley, 1992; Wells 
& Morrison, 1994). However, contrary to Langlois et al.'s (2004) findings in a non-
clinical sample, the mean scores for illness intrusions were not located between 
obsessions and worries, neither for egodystonicity, nor for basis in reality. Clinical illness 
intrusions seem to be as based in reality as obsessions (i.e. lower than GAD) and are as 
low on egodystonicity as worries. This means that egodystonicity and the basis in reality 
seem distinctive of obsessions and worries, respectively. However, an examination of the 
variance of the three groups of patients of both items warns against an oversimplified 
interpretation of the results: some of the patients with hypochondriasis might present 
more egodystonic thoughts than some patients with OCD (e.g. contamination obsessions 
might be less egodystonic than illness intrusions), and also some illness intrusions (e.g. 
the belief of having the same disease as a parent)  might be rated as more based in reality 
than some worries (e.g. the overestimation of the likelihood plane crash when a loved one 
is on the plane). Despite some discrepancies about the role of egodystonicity as a 
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necessary ingredient in OCD (Audet, Aardema, & Moulding, 2016; Salkovskis & Millar, 
2016) this result is coherent with those who consider it a useful construct (e.g. Clark & 
Purdon, 2016) and that obsessions might have both egodystonic and egosyntonic 
components (Purdon, Cripps, Faull, Joseph, & Rowa, 2007). These results also point out 
that both the egodystonicity-egosyntonicity continuum and basis in reality of the thoughts 
might be also considered in both the assessment and treatment of GAD and 
hypochondriasis. 
For the hypotheses about emotions, the first about guilt for having the thought was 
partially supported. From a clinical point of view, these results are perhaps unsurprising. 
Despite some claims about the involvement of guilt in anxiety disorders in general (e.g. 
Fergus, Valentiner, McGrath, & Jencius, 2010), there is some evidence for its central role 
in OCD (Mancini & Gangemi, 2014; Rosen, 1975; Shapiro & Stewart, 2011), even from 
a neurobiological perspective (Hennig-Fast et al., 2015). The hypothesis about a different 
kind of guilt, guilt for not having the thought, was fully supported by the results. This 
difference was expected because this kind of guilt is related to positive beliefs about 
worries, one of the components of the cognitive model of GAD proposed by Dugas et al. 
(1998, 2005). Finally, the absence of differences in insecurity between the three samples 
(the only statistically significant difference was between obsessions and illness intrusions, 
but not after Bonferroni correction), might be due to that insecurity is an unspecific 
marker of clinical severity or that insecurity has a different meaning in relation to clinical 
intrusions across disorders. The three type of thoughts provoked high levels of insecurity 
in clinical samples, contrary to the findings in non-clinical participants which showed that 
worries provoked higher levels of insecurity than obsessions (Langlois et al., 2000a, 
2000b, 2004), which may reflect that the worries reflect concerns, albeit exaggerated or 
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excessive, based in the lives of non-clinical participants whereas obsessions are typically 
about unusual or low frequency events. 
The hypothesis about neutralization strategies was fully supported, and  unsurprising, 
given that many compulsions are considered neutralization strategies (Freeston & 
Ladouceur, 1997; Rachman, Shafran, Mitchell, Trant, & Teachman, 1996). 
The results did not support the hypothesis about frequency. Contrary to predictions 
based on previous results in non-clinical samples, clinical obsessions and worries were 
equally frequent and illness intrusions were less frequent than them. From a clinical 
perspective the lack of differences are perhaps unsurprising as some authors reported that 
one of the most important differences between non-clinical and clinical obsessions is their 
frequency (Abramowitz et al., 2014; Gibbs, 1996; Rachman, 1978; Salkovskis & 
Harrison, 1984) and obsessional intrusive thoughts may be a rarer and less frequent than 
worries in non-clinical samples, but obviously in clinical samples of OCD obsessions are 
present.  It is less clear why illness intrusions should be less frequent other than the 
possibility that occurrence of illness intrusions may be dependent on current symptoms 
to trigger them, so that if symptoms are not present they may not be triggered; however 
this speculation only. Both hypotheses about verbal and visual presentation of the 
thoughts were partially supported. However, it is important to note that illness intrusions 
were as verbal and as visual as obsessions, which means that, in that respect, are closer 
to obsessions than to worries. This might be quite relevant to their differential diagnosis 
and to the use of some therapeutic techniques used for obsessions rather than those used 
for worries. Finally, the hypothesis about the body sensation as a trigger was fully 
supported which was unsurprising, given the inherent characteristics of hypochondriasis 
(Warwick & Salkovskis, 1990). 
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The differences remained largely significant even after stringent Bonferroni 
correction and after controlling for age and depression. It is likely that part of the variance 
associated with the differences between groups may have been removed when controlling 
for age and depression. In fact, despite the common use of ANCOVA for the control of 
possible confounding variables (i.e. Langlois et al. 2000b), Field (2011) among others do 
not recommend its use if the covariates vary as a function of the independent variable as 
well as of the dependent variable. So, some of the no longer significant differences after 
the ANCOVA might in fact be type II errors when “true” between groups variance has 
been removed.  
The binomial logistic regression analyses showed three statistically significant 
models for the discrimination between obsessions and worries, obsessions and illness 
intrusions and worries and illness intrusions. Guilt remained as predictor in the three 
equations, which highlight its importance in the processing of these type of thoughts. 
High frequency of body stimuli as trigger seems to be particularly important on illness 
intrusions, since it is a key factor for their discrimination from both obsessions and 
worries. High frequency of neutralization strategies is important in the differentiation 
between obsessions and both worries and illness intrusions.  
The results of this study indicate that despite shared characteristics, there are some 
features that can help to differentiate between obsessions, worries and illness intrusions. 
Interestingly, many of these features are not present in diagnostic criteria and 
consequently are not taken into account in differential diagnosis. However, statistically 
significant differences between three clinical groups on a variable does not mean that it 
should be a diagnostic criterion. Further, an examination of the means and standard 
deviations of the scores as well as the distributions of the predictive probabilities indicate 
overlap between the groups. The results of this study as well as those by Langlois et al. 
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(2004), Watkins, Moulds and Mackintosh (2005) and Wahl et al. (2011) indicate that the 
thoughts studied share many characteristics but differ in degree, so a dimensional 
perspective could enrich the research on intrusive thoughts across disorders and some 
variables may in fact indicate underlying transdiagnostic processes. These results may 
also support the importance of adopting a transdiagnostic perspective in the psychological 
treatment of these disorders. For instance, some strategies targeted to modify the 
estimation of the basis in reality of worries could be used in illness intrusions similar in 
that feature, or strategies used with obsessions could be implemented in psychotherapies 
of particularly egodystonic illness intrusions, or even worries. Despite the undoubted 
importance of well-validated single-disorder models for the understanding of disorders 
such as OCD, GAD, and hypochondriasis, the availability of a transdiagnostic perspective 
in the evaluation and treatment for some patients, perhaps with comorbid of non-
prototypical presentations, might improve their prognosis. 
Some of the limitations of this study are related to the single self-report measure used 
for the assessment of the key variables. The study relies on the understanding or the 
interpretation of the items by the patients. However, the subjectivity of a measure is not 
necessarily a flaw, given that emotions or most appraisals are subjective by nature, despite 
some occasional attempts to assess the construct using objective behavioural measures, 
for example for responsibility (e.g. Ladouceur et al., 1995) or intolerance of uncertainty 
(e.g. Ladouceur, Gosselin, & Dugas, 2000) or that some appraisals, such as 
egodystonicity or basis in reality might have an objective component (Audet et al., 2016). 
The main limitation of the study is the assessment of each construct by one item. Given 
the number of variables to be measured to operationalize information processing of 
intrusive thoughts across different disorders, an extensive battery would be needed, or a 
questionnaire which measured briefly all the variables. The first option probably may 
23 
 
allow a more reliable assessment of the variables, but the study would be very difficult in 
practical terms. Further, it may change the level of the measurement to more trait-like 
measures rather than appraisals of specific target thoughts. The second option (used here) 
enabled a large number of constructs to be measured without being overly long. The fact 
the constructs relate all to one target thought and one item measures each construct also 
allows greater focus. Further, the validation study of the CIQ-TV showed that this 
measure is both reliable and valid for the assessment of intrusive thoughts in relation to 
different measures of psychopathology, including symptom measures for OCD, GAD, 
depression or social anxiety (Romero-Sanchiz et al., 2017). Other potential limitations 
are related with the characteristics of the groups. Patients with GAD were more frequently 
diagnosed with a comorbid disorder, especially depression, and hypochondriasis patients 
were younger than the other two groups. We have tried to minimize the influence of these 
variables by statistical control. 
As far as we know, this is the first study that compares obsessions, worries and illness 
intrusions in clinical samples and clarifies some of the more important differences.  
Indeed, combinations of variables lead to very high specificity and sensitivity in 
discriminating between the intrusions reported by the different diagnostic groups, 
especially between obsession and the other two types (all > 95%). This type of 
methodology could be used for the study of other kinds of thoughts using a dimensional 
perspective, such as thoughts associated with social anxiety, rumination in depressions, 
or even thoughts experienced in psychosis. Furthermore, other variables included in the 
CIQ-TV (but not found relevant in non-clinical studies), such as shame, duration of the 




The results of this study showed that clinical obsessions, worries and illness 
intrusions, despite sharing many characteristics, they also show differences in variables 
that could contribute to differential diagnosis beyond the content of the thoughts but may 
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Table 1. Sociodemographic variables and psychopathology measures. 
Measure OCD (N= 35) GAD (N= 36) HYP (N=34) F or χ2 df Differences 
Mean age (SD) 38.57 (11.65) 41.50 (11.38) 31.59 (11.49) 6.80* 2 HYP<OCD,GAD 
Women (%) 21 (60.0) 22 (61.1) 24 (70.6) 1.01 2 - 
Marital status 
    Married (%) 
21 (60.0) 29 (80.0) 11 (32.4) 20.16* 6 - 
    Divorced (%) 0 (3,4) 2 (7,1) 2 (6,5)    













Medication (%) 20 (57.1) 22 (61.1) 12 (35.3) 5.35 2 - 
Measures 











   WAQ 59.59 (16.33) 68.86 (13.85) 54.76 (15.83) 7.56* 2 GAD>OCD,HYP 
   S-HAI 33.00 (8.78) 36.49 (6.71) 46.47 (9.82) 22.91* 2 HYP>OCD,GAD 
   BDI 17.21 (10.27) 22.80 (9.82) 12.59 (8.60) 9.81* 2 GAD>OCD,HYP 
   BAI 18.29 (14.21) 22.49 (12.48) 16.09 (11.99) 2.62 2 - 
* p < .001; OCD = obsessive-compulsive disorder; GAD = generalized anxiety disorder; HYP = 
hypochondriasis; OCI-R = Obsessive Compulsive Inventory – Revised; WAQ = Worry and Anxiety 
Questionnaire; S-HAI = Short – Health Anxiety Inventory; BDI = Beck Depression Inventory; BAI = 
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* p< .05; ** p< .001; In bold, statistically significant differences after Bonferroni correction (p< .05/12 
= .004); OCD = obsessive-compulsive disorder; GAD = generalized anxiety disorder; HYP = 
hypochondriasis; BDI = Beck Depression Inventory. 
 
